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Success bonuses are often introduced in order to boost performance above ordinary lev-
els. Football players are promised a bonus if they win important matches, budgets of
academics are tied to their publication record, lawyers get an additional reward if they
win a case and builders receive premiums for timely completion. In all these cases, success
increases with the eort of an agent (the football player, academic, lawyer, etc.) but is
also aected by factors beyond the agent's in
uence|that is, luck. Rewarding an agent
for success seems like a good idea to increase his eort and thus ultimately the probability
of success. The present paper critically examines this intuition. It provides conditions
such that no success bonus (however large it may be) induces an agent to exert more
eort. With the additional assumption that the agent's liability is limited, the optimal
contract is independent of success|even though success is informative about eort, ver-
iable, and costless. Moreover, when the agent is initially participating and motivated,
success bonuses can even reduce eort and the probability of success.
The rst result is that paying a small success bonus to an agent who likes money can
lead to the same or even lower eort by this agent (Proposition 1). This nding hinges
on two conditions: one about agent's preferences, the other about the success signal.
Success bonuses are typically introduced because the agent would not voluntarily provide
more eort; a reasonable starting point is thus that eort is a 'bad' rather than a 'good.'
The condition on agents' preferences is that eort is a normal bad. In other words, the
willingness to engage in eort decreases when the agent gets richer; or formally: the
cross-derivative of the agent's utility in eort and money is negative. If eort is a normal
1bad, there is a perceived income eect. Although the agent does not actually get richer
before the outcome is realized, any bonus implies that the agent behaves as if he were
richer; more specically, the certainty equivalent for the lottery that he faces increases
and hence the marginal costs of eort become larger. There is thus a tendency to reduce
eort. This perceived income eect needs to be traded-o against the usual incentive
eect of a bonus. The crucial variable that determines this trade-o is the marginal eect
of eort, e, on the probability of success, p0(e), in relation to this probability itself, p(e),
the success hazard-rate of eort: p0(e)=p(e): The condition about the signal is that this
rate is low, so that the perceived income eect dominates the incentive eect. Jointly the
two conditions imply that a small success bonus reduces eort.
The second result provides an additional condition such that no success bonus induces
the agent to exert more eort (Proposition 2). The familiar assumption that marginal
utility of money decreases is typically justied by saying that it becomes increasingly
dicult to seek good opportunities for spending money. This may be true regardless
of an agent's eort. However, an agent who exerted less eort may seize opportunities
that are overlooked by an agent who is tired because he exerted more eort. In this
case, the decrease in the marginal utility of money is likely to be larger for larger eort.
This assumption ensures that the normal character of eort is even more pronounced, if
the agent becomes richer. Given this assumption, an agent cannot be enticed to exert
more eort|irrespective of the size of the success bonus|because the dominance of the
perceived income eect over the incentive eect for a small success bonus translates into
an even a larger dominance for a large success bonus.
2The third nding is a direct corollary to the second one: given the previous conditions
and assuming that the agent's liability is limited, the optimal contract is not based on the
success information (Corollary 1). The logic is straightforward. With limited liability, the
only way to provide incentives to the agent is to use success bonuses. Since no bonus can
induce the agent to exert more eort, bonuses only lead to costs, which can be avoided
by ignoring the success information.
One of the seminal ndings from the moral-hazard literature is Holmstr om's sucient
statistic result: any freely available independent information about agent's eort will be
used in the optimal contract (Holmstr om, 1979, 1982). Amershi and Hughes (1989) point
out that the result only holds for a restricted class of distributions, while Holmstr om
and Milgrom (1991) show that it is limited to single-task settings. The present paper
complements these observations: even in a standard single-task principal-agent model,
agent's preferences may prevent all freely available information from being used in the
optimal contract.
The fact that success bonuses have an immediate eect on income and can thus detri-
mentally aect eort and success has to my knowledge not yet been discussed in the
literature.1 However, there are two contributions that deal with the somewhat related
eect of wealth on incentives. Mookherjee (1997) shows that agents who are extremely
poor or rich are harder to motivate than agents of intermediate wealth; the very poor
1The reason is probably that most most principal-agent models assume for mathematical convenience
that the agent's preferences are additively separable in eort and money or can be represented by a
negative exponential utility (for an exception see Grossman and Hart, 1983). These assumptions, however,
eliminate the eect.
3because they have little wealth to use as a collateral and the very rich because they derive
relatively little marginal utility from money. Thiele and Wambach (1999) ask the related
question whether the principal's surplus is greater from poor than from rich agents and
provide a corresponding condition. The crucial dierence of both articles to the present
paper is that wealth in these contributions is exogenous. In contrast, the present pa-
per examines how promising a success bonus endogenously determines agent's expected
`wealth' and thus his behavior.
The nding that bonuses can reduce eort is consistent with experimental as well
as empirical evidence (see the survey articles by Bowles, 2008; Frey and Jegen, 2001)
and complements various models that explain this evidence by psychological eects of
incentives (see B enabou and Tirole, 2003; Sliwka, 2007; Friebel and Schnedler, 2007;
Schnedler and Vadovic, 2007; Herold, forthcoming). At the heart of all these models is an
informational asymmetry: the principal knows more than the agent and this information
is revealed by the provision of incentives. In contrast to the often involved signaling
models, the explanation here is simple: bonuses reduce the agent's marginal willingness
to engage in eort because they make him richer.
The next section presents a simple model to illustrate the mechanisms at work. This
model is then analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 summarizes the ndings.
2 Model
Consider an agent (he) who works for a principal (she) on a project that can be successful
(s = 1) or not (s = 0). Success can be veried by courts and its probability p increases in
4the eort e of the agent, where e is a non-negative real number and p a twice continuously
dierentiable and concave function of e with p0(0) > 0.
Agent's utility. The agent's utility depends on money m and some non-negative ef-
fort e: u(m;e); where u is a twice continuously dierentiable concave function in m and
e. While the utility is strictly concave in e to ensure a unique solution, it may be weakly
or strictly concave in m, so that risk-neutrality as well as risk-aversion is covered. The
utility is supposed to strictly increase in money, so that success bonuses can have an
eect on eort. In the absence of the success bonus, there is some initial eort level
e0 := argmaxe u(0;e); which may be zero as in most moral-hazard models or positive as
in Holmstr om and Milgrom (1991). The latter captures situations in which the agent is
initially motivated and allows us later to study the consequences of success bonuses in
this case.
Interaction between the marginal utility of money and eort. Principal-agent models
often assume away any interaction between eort and money in the agent's utility, i.e.
u(m;e) is supposed to be additively separable, so that
@2u(m;e)
@m@e = 0. Here, interactions are
allowed. In particular, it is possible that more eort reduces the marginal utility from
money or (equivalently) that more money increases the marginal dis-utility from eort:2
@2u(m;e)
@m@e < 0. In this case, the agent strictly prefers less eort when he is richer and in
line with standard terminology eort is normal; the term weakly normal is used if the
preference is not strict.
Principal's prot. The principal likes success and dislikes paying money to the agent.
2The equivalence follows from Young's theorem.
5The details of the prot function, however, are not essential. For simplicity, suppose the
prot is (s;m) := s   m:
Contractual environment. All that can be observed is the success or failure of the
project: s = 1 and s = 0. Any contract has to specify transfers (t0;t1); where t0 is the
payment in case of failure and t1 that in case of success. In line with everyday language,
we dene a success bonus as transfers that satisfy: t1 > t0  0.
3 Analysis
The eort choice that maximizes the joint surplus of principal and agent in the absence
of incentives is:
e
 := argmaxeu(0;e) + ES [(S;0)] = u(0;e) + p(e);
where S is the random variable that describes success and can take on the realizations
s = 1 and s = 0. The maximizer e of the joint surplus is unique because the objective
function is concave. Recall that the actual choice in the absence of transfers is:
e
0 = argmaxeu(0;e):
Comparing the two objective functions, it becomes clear that the agent fails to internalize
the externality of his eort choice on the principal and that the eort in the absence of
incentives e0 is too small from a social point of view: e0 < e: Since eort itself cannot
be contractually stipulated, the principal has to rely on the project's success in order to
provide incentives. This leads to the central question: Can the principal induce a higher
eort level than e0 by using a success bonus?
6First, note that weakly normal eort implies that a bonus in the case of failure, t0 > 0,
cannot be optimal (see Lemma 1 in the appendix). The intuition for this result is that
such a transfer is irrelevant for participation, costly to the principal, and would reduce
the agent's motivation.
Under the assumption that eort is weakly normal, a bonus implies that the agent's
maximization problem is well-behaved. Exploiting the agent's rst-order condition with
the implicit-function theorem, one can study how the introduction of a success bonus
aects eort. The proof for this and the following results can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 1. Let eort be weakly normal. Suppose the agent initially exerts no eort,
e0 = 0, then a small success bonus does not increase eort if and only if the income eect
dominates the incentive eect:
p(e)  ( 1) 
@2u(t;e)
@m@e






   
t=0;e=e0
: (1)
Suppose the agent initially exerts eort, e0 > 0, then a small success bonus reduces eort
if and only if inequality (1) holds.
The important insight from this proposition is that a small bonus payment may well
decrease eort. Since success is an increasing function of eort, paying for success can
thus lower the probability of success. Notice that this can only happen if the marginal
utility of transfers is lower when the agent exerts more eort (
@2u(m;e)
@m@e < 0). So, a reduction
of eort cannot occur if the utility is separable in eort and transfers; eort needs to be
normal.
If eort is normal, introducing a success bonus has two qualitative eects, which are
re
ected by inequality (1). First, it increases the marginal disutility of eort in case of
7success; the agent becomes richer in the sense that the certainty equivalent of the lottery
that he faces is larger (left-hand side). Second, it increases the gains from eort; the
agent thus has more incentives to exert eort (right-hand side). The trade-o of these
two eects depends on the ratio p0(e)=p(e). In other words, the eect of the next unit
of eort on the probability of success in relation to this probability, the hazard-rate of
success (in eort), is crucial. This is interesting for two reasons. First, the parameter
has a simple interpretation: the marginal eect of eort on success needs to be large in
relation to the probability of being lucky. Second, the same parameter already features in
other contexts. It is used in econometrical hazard-rate models (hence its name) but also
induces an ordering in terms of employment probabilities and rents in adverse selection
models (see Schnedler, 2002).
Notice that although bonuses aect income, the eect is dierent from the income eect
in a standard labor supply model. While the standard eect is based on a deterministic
link between hours worked and wage, the eect here is based on a stochastic link and
becomes less relevant if the agent gains more control over the outcome (in the sense that
the hazard-rate of success increases). It disappears entirely if the relationship between
eort and success is deterministic because the agent can then no longer rely on luck to
obtain the bonus.
The preceding proposition only deals with small bonuses. So the dictum of Gneezy
and Rustichini (2000), `Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All', may well hold in our model.
As the following proposition shows, this is no longer possible if the utility from money
becomes more concave for larger eort.
8Proposition 2. Suppose that eort is normal,
@2u(m;e)
@m@e < 0, the marginal utility of trans-
fers decreases more if more eort is exerted, @
@e
@2u(m;e)
@m2 < 0, and inequality (1) holds.
Then, no success bonus can implement an eort larger than e0.
The intuition behind this result is that the marginal eect of incentives weakens with larger
bonus payments while the eect on marginal costs gets stronger. The result highlights
that under some circumstances, it is impossible to increase eort using success bonuses.
It also directly leads to the observation that under limited liability, it may not be optimal
to use the success information at all. Without success bonuses the eort level is e0. A
necessary condition for the optimal contract to be based on the success information is that
the contract implements an eort level above e0. Otherwise, the expected payment to the
agent only increases the principal's costs. Then, the only way to increase eort is through
a success bonus (see Lemma 1). However, under the conditions from Proposition 2,
there is no success bonus that generates a higher eort level than e0. Hence, transfers
in the optimal contract must be constant in the success information. The argument is
independent of whether the participation constraint is binding; it thus holds in particular
when the agent's expected utility is equal to his outside option. These insights can be
summarized as follows.
Corollary 1. Suppose the conditions from Proposition 2 hold and the agent's liability is
limited. Then, the optimal contract does not condition on the freely available information
about success and failure.
The corollary emphasizes that the sucient statistic result fails under seemingly innocent
assumptions about agent's preferences.
94 Conclusion
Success bonuses can lead to a lower probability of success. As with any bonus payment,
they increase agents' perceived income. Under the arguably reasonable assumption that
more income reduces the agent's willingness to engage in eort, there is a perceived
income eect that needs to be traded-o against the incentive eect of a success bonus.
This perceived income eect is dierent from the income eect in a standard labor supply
problem: the extent to which bonuses reduce eort depends crucially on the link between
eort and success; it gets smaller when the agent has more control over success and
disappears if the link is deterministic.
This paper shows that incentives may fail under innocuous assumptions even if they do
not fall foul of the \Folly of Rewarding for A while hoping for B" (Kerr, 1975). The paper
thus complements well-known reasons for the failure of incentive schemes such as multi-
tasking (Holmstr om and Milgrom, 1991) and helps explain why explicit incentives are not
more widely spread. The failure crucially depends on the assumption that the agent's
liability is limited. Without this restriction, it is possible to set-o the bonus by a ne,
keep the agent's income constant, and eliminate the perceived income eect. Presumably,
this is the reason why the problem is not mentioned even if the utility function allows
interaction between income and eort as in Grossman and Hart (1983).
A tentative conclusion from our results could be that success bonuses should be accom-
panied by a ne to keep perceived income constant. While practitioners tend to advocate
success bonuses, they often advise against nes in case of failure. From a theoretical
perspective and bearing in mind the results of this paper, this seems an unnecessary and
10potentially harmful restriction. More behaviorally oriented economists, however, argue
that taking away from an agent is problematic because it may result in negative reciprocity
(see e.g. Bewley, 1995; Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006).
A direct practical implication of this paper is that before trying to boost eort by
paying for success, it is sensible to ensure that the incentive eect is not dominated by
the perceived income eect. For example, one should verify that the agent's eort strongly
aects the probability of success and that his chances to succeed are not too large to begin
with.
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Proofs
Lemma 1. If the marginal utility of money weakly decreases in eort, @2u
@m@e  0, a bonus
for failure (t0 > t1) cannot be optimal.
Proof. The agent's expected utility can be written as u(t0;e)+(1 p(e))(u(t0;e) u(t1;e)):













13Given that t0 > t1 and @2u
@m@e  0, this derivative is strictly negative. So, the agent has an
incentive to reduce rather than increase eort. Since this reduction leads to costs for the
































Using that p is concave and u strictly concave in e and that t1  t0, the rst line becomes
negative. Since @2u
@m@e  0 and by evoking once more the strict concavity of e, the second
line is non-positive.
Proof Proposition 1. Given (t0;t1), the agent's expected utility can be written as:














If eort is weakly normal and a success bonus is used, the agent's incentive problem
is concave (see Lemma 2) and the rst-order condition based on (4) is necessary and





















3Interestingly, the agent's objective function is not necessarily concave if the marginal utility of trans-
fers is increasing in eort.
14where (t1;t0;e) is the rst derivative of the agent's payo with respect to e. Note that
(t1;t0;e) is negative near t1 = t0 = 0 and e = e0. The sign of the derivative is hence
determined by the second factor which is negative whenever inequality (1) holds. By
continuity, the result holds for any small t1.
Proof of Proposition 2. Since
@2u(t;e)
@m@e < 0, it holds by Lemma 2 that the agent's utility
is concave and the incentive constraint can be represented by the rst-order condition.
The induced eort is then implicitly dened by the incentive constraint as a continuous
and dierentiable function ~ e of the bonus t1. Applying the implicit-function theorem, we
obtain that this function falls at t = 0 and e0 = 0 because of (1). Next examine any






t=0;e=e0 due to the concavity









t=t0;e=e0: Moreover, since @
@e
@2u(t;e)









t=t0;e=e0. So, ~ e decreases in t for any t0 such that ~ e(t0) = e0 and hence never
exceeds e0.
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